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IF IT AIN'T BROKE DON'T FIX IT: AN ARGUMENT FOR THE
CODIFICATION OF THE QUILL STANDARD FOR TAXING
INTERNET COMMERCE
SIDNEY S. SILHAN*

INTRODUCTION

The Internet has become a part of everyday life, both personal
and professional, as well as a pivotal element in many businesses'
strategic plans.' Internet-related business ranges from basic Internet
and database access to gambling, banking or stock tracking and
trading; indeed, this feeble list barely scratches the surface of the
Internet's capabilities.' Users who purchase goods and services off
the Internet are responsible for much of this increased use,3 and like
* C.P.A.; C.M.A.; J.D. candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology, 2002; M.S.T., DePaul University, 1996; B.S., Northern Illinois University, 1993.
Mr. Silhan is a State Tax Consulting manager at PricewaterhouseCoopers, specializing in
income and sales tax issues for multistate taxpayers. This paper is written as part of the J.D.
program at Chicago-Kent College of Law. The author wishes to thank Jacob CorrA for his
invaluable comments and Ana Mencini for her patience and editing assistance, as well as all
those who put up with my repeated requests for input.
1. In 1997, four companies alone were responsible for about $3 billion in Internet
commerce: General Electric Co., Cisco Systems, Intel Corp., and Dell Computer Corp. See Ada
Ko, A National Sales Tax After Quill? A Proposalfor State and Local Taxation of the Sale of
Goods and Services on the Internet, 17 STATE TAX NOTES 53, 54 (1999).
2. The Internet Tax Freedom Act defined e-commerce as "any transaction conducted
over the Internet or through Internet access, comprising the sale, lease, license, offer, or
delivery of property, goods, services, or information, whether or not for consideration, and
includes the provision of Internet access." See Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1004(3), 47 U.S.C. §
151 (1998). For actual volume detail, see National Governor's Association, Sales Shift from
Brick and Mortar Retail Sales to On-line Sales (visited Feb. 11, 2000) <http://www.nga.org/
internet/SalesShift.asp> (indicating that between 1999 and 2002 sales over the Internet will jump
from $18 billion to $76 billion); see also Press Release, Ernst & Young, Season's E-Tail Sales
Figures Expected to Reach $12-15 Billion (visited Nov. 10, 1999) <http://www.ey.com/newsl
releases/110999.asp> (indicating that the number of respondents to their annual survey who did
at least 10% of their shopping on-line jumped from 23% to 67% between 1998 and 1999, and
that 19% (up from 4%) will do 50% or more of their shopping on-line).
3. See Robert J. Cline & Thomas S. Neubig, The Sky Is Not Falling: Why State and Local
Revenues Were Not Significantly Impacted by the Internet in 1998, ERNST & YOUNG
ECONOMICS CONSULTING AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS at 7 (June 18, 1999) <http://
www.ey.com/ebusiness/insights/tax-strat.asp> (indicating that 37% of internet sales are taxable,
end-user sales); see also Rep. Christopher Cox, R-Calif., Web Commerce, A Tempting Target for
Tax Collectors? (visited Nov. 10, 1999) <http://www.house.gov/cox/nettax/web-commerce.html>
(estimating that at the start of 1999, 150 million people worldwide were using the Internet).
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any other purchase, sales and use taxes will often apply. 4 Because

such taxes directly affect the coffers of most states, 5 and the inherent

ability of Internet sales to escape taxation, 6 states want to be very

much involved in the development of an Internet tax policy.7 Their
involvement to date is advisory only, because the states are prevented
from imposing any new taxes 8 on Internet business, also known as ecommerce, until at least October 2001, and potentially for an
additional three to five years. 9 This moratorium is imposed by the

Internet Tax Freedom Act 10 ("ITFA"), which Congress passed and

4. How they apply and the items to which they apply is itself a complicated issue. See
Dale Yancey et al., Electronic Commerce Snares Sellers in Multistate Tax Web, 63 PRACT. TAX
STRATEGIES 260 (1999) (listing twenty different factors that can determine where an Internet
sale has taken place and which state should tax it).
5. Sales taxes are a principal revenue source for state and local governments. Forty-five
of the fifty states, plus the District of Columbia, impose a sales tax (Alaska, Delaware, Montana,
New Hampshire, and Oregon do not impose sales or use taxes). See 2 JEROME R.
HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION $ 2.01 (3d ed. 1998). In the year
ending March 31, 1998, general sales taxes equated to over $155 billion, representing between
21% (New York) and 80% (Nevada) of total state taxes collected. See Cline & Neubig, supra
note 3, at tbl.1; see also GOV'T AND FIN. BRANCH, CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, QUARTERLY SUMMERY OF STATE AND LOCAL TAX REVENUE (1999) (estimating
total collections for 1999 at $237 billion). Rates range from .875% to 11%; note, however, the
recent proposal by the ACEC Business Caucus to reduce tax rates across the board. See
ADVISORY COMM'N ON ELEC. COMMERCE, DRAFT COPY OF REPORT APPROVED BY
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, BNA DAILY TAX REPORT 15 (Mar. 31,
2000) <http://www.ecommercecommission.org>.
6. See Cline & Neubig, supra note 3, at 14, for figures; see also David Hardesty, ECommerce Commission Calls For a New Tax System, E-COMMERCE TAX NEWS (visited Feb. 21,
2000) <http://ecommercetax.com/doc/092099.htm> (indicating that sales taxes would reduce online shopping by at least 25%).
7. The American states are not alone in their concerns. In November 1999, the European
E-Business Tax Group, a consortium of companies and consultants, released its paper outlining
invoicing requirements that directly impact European countries' taxation of the Internet. See
EUROPEAN E-BUSINESS TAX GROUP, RESPONSE TO THE COMMISSION WORKING PAPER ON
TAX AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (Nov. 1999). Also note reference to international ecommerce regulation and cooperation with the World Trade Organization (WTO), proposing
permanent support of the WTO's individual moratorium on tariffs and duties for electronic
transmissions, in ADVISORY COMM'N ON ELEC. COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 31.
8. A new tax is defined as a tax on Internet access charges that was not in place (and
enforced) before October 21, 1998. See Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1004(3), 47 U.S.C. § 151
(1998). On that date, nine states imposed Internet access charge taxes. The current proposal
recommends removing all such taxes. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON ELEC. COMMERCE, supra
note 5, at 20, which recommended removing even this grandfather clause for existing taxes on
Internet access, making all such taxes illegal. However, because of questions in the way the
majority vote was generated, the proposals in this report are just that; they are not considered
findings or recommendations. Whether they will be submitted to Congress in their current
format is unknown.
9. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON ELEC. COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 20. The ACEC
majority voted to extend the current moratorium for five more years.
10. See Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1102, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1998). The Act specifically
prohibits tax on electronic commerce. California also has its own mini-ITFA, see California
Internet Tax Freedom Act, 1993 CAL STAT. § 351, with similar restrictions.
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President Clinton signed in October 1998.11 The moratorium applies

solely to new taxes, and does not at all limit the states' current taxing
2
power, which reaches most Internet sales.

Contemporary sales and use tax jurisprudence has resulted in the
development of a substantial nexus requirement 3 before a state can
impose a sales or use tax, or can impose responsibility for collecting
those taxes.14 Substantial nexus has been defined as the physical
presence 5 of a taxpayer in a state, a concept that is as easily applied
to an on-line world as it was in the off-line world in which it was
developed.

16
This Note will show that, under current sales tax

jurisprudence, the states that impose a sales tax already have the
power and the means to collect sales tax (or enforce its collection) on
the vast majority of taxable Internet transactions.17 Through a
consistent application of the physical presence standard for
substantial nexus, and the adoption of creative and helpful tax
simplification measures, the states can ensure that they capture much
of the sales tax revenues that may currently be evading collection, and
18
may even increase their sales tax collections.

Part I of this Note discusses sales and use taxes generally, 19 the
11. President Clinton described the rationale of the Act with the comment: "[W]e cannot
allow 30,000 state and local tax jurisdictions to stifle the Internet, nor can we allow the erosion
of the revenue that state and local governments need to fight crime and invest in education."
PRESIDENT WILLIAM J. CLINTON, STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT (Oct. 21, 1998) <http://
www.house.gov/cox/nettax/clinton.html>.
12. All states with sales taxes impose that tax on sales of tangible personal property, either
over the counter or over the Internet, and the actual taxability of these items is not in dispute.
13. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill.,
386 U.S. 753, 756
(1967), together with Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), which set forth the
constitutionally based requirement of the physical presence of the seller in the state before
taxation is proper.
14. For purposes of this Note, imposition will also include the collection responsibility
imposed on the seller, and the term "tax" will apply interchangeably to the tax and the
obligation; however, the tax itself is not imposed on the seller, but the obligation to collect it and
remit to the state is. 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 5, [ 19.02.
15. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 307.
16. Unless otherwise indicated, sales tax will also include use tax. While the two are not
the same, I use sales tax here to simplify the text.
17. To wit, California Assemblywomen Migden and Aroner plan to introduce, in February
2000, a bill to enforce collection of sales tax on Internet sales using current (Quill) standards of
physical presence: "[Olur legislation simply clarifies what should be current practice." BNA
DAILY TAX REPORT, Jan. 27, 2000, at 3.
18. Some contemporary philosophy holds that information, from the Internet or any other
source, should not be taxed; it is important to clarify at the outset that this discussion focuses
not on the Internet as such, but rather on the sale of otherwise taxable personal property over
the Internet, and would in no way effect the taxability of items that might otherwise be exempt
from tax, such as information.
19. This Note does not specifically address local sales or use taxes. Thirty-three states
currently allow local jurisdictions to assess sales taxes. These taxes are generally structured
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constitutional and judicial restrictions on the imposition of these
taxes, 20 and the impact of the ITFA. Part II suggests that Congress
codify the Supreme Court's ruling in Quill, 21 which requires physical
presence in a state before a state is allowed to impose a sales tax

collection obligation, and examines some of the tax simplification
measures proposed to facilitate tax collection in the electronic world.

Part III highlights the similarities in taxability between a traditional
mail-order seller and an Internet seller through a hypothetical
company that engages in both mail-order and e-commerce sales. This
simplified example shows that states are not placed at a disadvantage

when attempting to collect sales tax on Internet sales versus mailorder sales.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONTEMPORARY SALES TAX
JURISPRUDENCE AND THE IMPACT OF THE IFTA

A.

Sales and Use Taxes Generally

A sales tax is a tax on the retail sale of specified property2 or
services.2 3 The tax is expressed as a percentage of the retail cost of
the property or service.24 In the traditional "consumer levy" tax
jurisdiction,2 the buyer pays the tax at the time of the sale, and the
similarly to the state tax, and in all but five states, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, and
Louisiana, the local taxes are collected and remitted by the state. In these instances, the state is
merely a conduit, and proper collection of the local, as well as the state, tax continues to rest
with the seller. Nonetheless, these local taxes can account for significant revenues, and they
certainly account for the vast majority of taxing jurisdictions and are only disregarded here for
ease of discussion. See 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 5, 19.02.
20. The primary focus of this Note is on tangible personal property for sale over the
Internet. I do not here address the complicated issue of the sale and transmission over the
Internet of intangible property, or tangible property in electronic format, such as music or
software, because the application of the physical presence test should also apply to the seller in
these situations. The medium of transfer should not necessarily change the taxability.
However, note the recent proposal by the ACEC to permanently ban taxation of items
delivered electronically. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON ELEC. COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 26.
21. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
22. In most cases, only tangible personal property is subject to tax. In some cases, what is
commonly perceived as intangible personal property is subject to sales tax as tangible personal
property. For example, computer software is sometimes considered tangible and therefore
taxable. Real property is usually not subject to sales tax, but may be subject to a transfer tax.
See 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 5, IT 13.01, 13.05.
23. Id. 12.05.
24. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1339-40 (6th ed. 1990). For a general discussion of sales
taxes, see 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 5, 17.01.
25. Examples are: Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, MULTISTATE
SALES TAX GUIDE 2701 (1993).
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seller collects and remits the tax as an agent for the taxing
jurisdiction. 26 All states that impose a sales tax, and many local

jurisdictions, also impose a complementary use tax.27 The use tax is
an "ingenious legal device that was developed to safeguard state sales

tax" 28 by imposing tax on "the privilege of using, consuming,
distributing or storing tangible personal property after it is brought
into the State from without the State. '29 The use tax is designed to
capture sales tax revenue that would otherwise be lost, since the sales
transaction, which is ordinarily the point of collection, occurred outof-state. The use rates are generally the same as the sales tax rates,30
and the payment of a sales tax to an out-of-state vendor will usually
qualify as a credit towards the use tax.3" This credit mechanism is
32
designed to prevent double taxation of the same item.
Most states require the consumer to self-assess the use tax, since

the only collection agent (the seller) in the transaction does not have
a taxable, physical presence in the reporting state.33 However, if the
seller has the requisite taxable nexus in the consumer's home state,
the state can impose a sales tax collection obligation on the seller,
thus guaranteeing the collection of the tax. 34 The obligation is
imposed in return for the seller having purposefully availed itself of
and benefited from the taxing state's laws and market.35
The use tax is theoretically effective when applied to sales of

tangible personal property, but cannot ordinarily be enforced as a
complementary tax against services purchased

out-of-state

but

26. See David C. Blum, State and Local Taxing Authorities: Taking More Than Their Fair
Share of the Electronic Information Age, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 493, 522 n.6
(1996).
27. States' authority to levy these taxes is derived from the 10th Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, which states that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
28. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of IlL, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
29. See 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 5, $ 16.01.
30. See id. $ 16.11[3] and the discussion therein about state use tax rates that were higher
than the same state's sales tax rates, designed to encourage local purchases over out-of-state
purchases. Such laws are consistently struck down as repugnant to the Commerce Clause.
31. Id. $ 16.03.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Robert J. Cline & Thomas S. Neubig, Masters of Complexity and Bearers of Great
Burden: The Sales Tax System and Compliance Costs for Multistate Retailers, ERNST & YOUNG
ECONOMICS CONSULTING AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 3 (Sept. 8, 1999) <http://
www.ey.corn/ebusiness/insights/taxstrat.asp>; see also 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra
note 5, $ 19.02.
35. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
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performed in state. As a practical matter, however, use taxes are
often totally avoided unless a collection burden is imposed on the

seller.36 This is especially true for individual consumers, as opposed to
business consumers, since unlike individuals, many business
consumers undergo regular use tax audits and have use tax selfassessment procedures in place to ensure proper compliance.37

Generally, the individual consumers are the cause of the states'
38
concern in the context of e-commerce.

B.

Composition of the Tax Base: What Items Are Taxable, and How
Is the Tax Collected?

Sales tax is usually imposed on sales of tangible personal
property, 39 which has historically been sold over the counter to the
buyer. The base is further expanded, in some states, to include certain
40
intangible personal property, such as software.

Due to the basic nature of this transaction, sales tax collection is
a minor burden on the one location, one jurisdiction retail seller. In
some states, the sales tax base was expanded to include certain
services, which were usually taxed at the same rate as sales of tangible
personal property. 41 Again, since the tax is collected at the time of

payment, and usually at the point of service, collection is not overly
burdensome to the vendor.
Because they are independent taxing jurisdictions, the states may
not all tax the same items, and each state will likely have a tax rate
that differs from its neighbor's rate on the same item. 4
This
inconsistency is compounded when the local taxing jurisdictions are
included, many of which have their own collection and compliance

36. See Cline & Neubig, supra note 34, at 5.
37. See National Governor's Association, Streamlined Sales Tax System for the 21st Century
(visited Feb. 11, 2000) <http://www.nga.org/internet/Proposal.asp> (indicating up to 500 sales
tax returns and potential audits per annum for multistate sellers).
38. This has practical motivations as well; many businesses buy items exempt as a sale for
resale or under another exemption certificate, such as for incorporation into real property, and
so many of the business-to-business sales are exempt from sales tax. See ADVISORY COMM'N
ON ELEC. COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 20. Individual consumers, on the other hand, generally
buy for self-consumption, which is subject to sales or use tax. The focus of this Note, like the
focus of the states' concerns, is on individual consumers.
39. See 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 5, 15.01.
40. In Illinois, for instance, computer software is a taxable tangible good-if it's sold as
prepackaged or canned software; custom designed software remains an intangible and is
exempt. 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. SEC. 120/2-25 (West 1986); 86 ILL. ADM. CODE 130.1935.
41. See 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 5, 1 15.01.
42. See Cline & Neubig, supra note 34, at 8.
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requirements, which brings the total number of independent taxing
jurisdictions in America to almost 7,500. 4 1 A multi-state seller" of

various products with a physical presence in many states is thus faced
with myriad tax bases, 45 rates, and collection schemes. These factors
are by no means all inclusive and only highlight the complexities
faced by multi-state sellers. 46 Generally, the sellers feel the tax

collection is overly burdensome; they often do not have the current
tax rate and base information, they do not have the resources to
properly track sales and comply with the filing requirements, 47 and

they like the competitive advantage that not having to collect tax
gives them.48 The states, of course, want the sellers to collect and

remit the tax, thereby ensuring collection and simplifying (the states'
own) tax administration. In part because the burden is not on them,
and despite the confusion and subsequent lack of compliance 49 that
results from this checkerboard-taxation, states have been extremely

hesitant to apply uniform rules to the sales tax structure.
Historically, this multi-jurisdictional collection obligation was a

problem faced only by those sellers who were "unlucky" enough to
have sales in more than one state. However, with relatively clear
sales tax nexus rules, based on physical presence, the seller could
effectively plan for, or around, the tax collection obligation. Yet, with
the evolution of the Internet, a small retailer could become a multistate seller literally overnight. 0 Imposing a tax collection obligation
43. See Doug Sheppard, Representatives of Cities, Software Publishers Square Off on
Internet Taxation, STATE TAX NOTES, Oct. 12, 1998, at 5 (estimating that the number could be
as high as 30,000, and later adding that "further research has shown that the 30,000 figure may
be understated").
44. The seller in question has often been a mail-order seller that sells to buyers in many
different jurisdictions. The focus has more often than not turned to the Internet seller.
45. Some items are generally taxable, but could be exempt, or subject to a lower rate,
based on the status of the buyer, or the use of the item, or whether it is sold during a "tax
holiday," when otherwise taxable items are exempt for sales tax to spur buying in a locality. See
2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 5, 10.01.
46. To add insult to injury, if a seller does not collect tax where it should, due either to
ignorance or mistake, the seller is liable to the state for the tax. See id. In some states, a buyer
who does not wish to be taxed must provide an exemption certificate to the seller. How such a
certificate is to be transmitted to the seller with the speed of cyberspace, accepted in good faith
and verified by the seller is unknown.
47. There are software products to help track these filing differences, and to assist in
compliance. However, the issue is fairness to the taxpayers; just because compliance is possible
does not mean it is easy or fair.
48. See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 2 (indicating that no sales tax was the motivation for
12% of on-line shoppers to snub the regular brick-and-mortar stores).
49. See Cline & Neubig, supra note 34, at 8 (detailing taxpayer's lack of compliance).
50. See USA TODAY, Oct. 26, 1999, at 15A (IBM e-business advertisement heralding the
creation of an interactive, sales-capable Web site in hours, at a cost of $39.95 a month).
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on such a seller, with a nexus standard of something other than
physical presence, could mean the retailer must collect up to 7,500
different sales taxes. Under such a compliance burden, the very
instrument that made this seller a success could quickly become the
instrument of its destruction.
The use of the Internet changes only the magnitude of sales
transactions; it does not change their basic taxable nature." In the
typical Internet sales transaction the buyer locates the seller's Web
site and completes a purchase." The seller may not know the address
of the buyer,53 further complicating the computation and collection of
sales tax. However, in most cases the sale is one of tangible personal
property, delivered by mail, so a ship-to address is required. With the
buyer's address, the seller attempts to determine if it has nexus with
the taxing jurisdiction, and if so, the correct tax rate to collect. If the
seller has nexus with the state and fails to collect the tax due from the
buyer, the seller becomes responsible for the tax.5 4 Before tax can be
properly calculated and collected, the seller must determine such
things as the status of the buyer (taxable, tax-exempt, or tax-exempt
for certain purchases), and the taxability of the property, including
how the property will be used. With Internet selling, this information
will often be unavailable.
Thus, like their traditional mail-order competitors, Internet
retailers must understand and apply the sales tax laws of many
different jurisdictions. In addition, Internet retailers also face the
added challenge of selling to unknown buyers over the Internet,
which could substantially and rapidly expand the jurisdictions in
which they do business. Fortunately, the current physical presence
standard allows them to determine conclusively where they are
subject to tax. Because of this physical presence standard, selling
over the Internet is not quite the tax minefield it might otherwise be.

51. Could the sale of software (taxable if transmitted via tapes or other tangible personal
property) over the Internet be exempt, since no tangible personal property changes hands? The
idea is considered in ADVISORY COMM'N ON ELEC. COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 21.
52. The buyer may also be a repeat buyer who has access to sellers' proprietary inventory
software to facilitate orders; if the seller retains title to this software, even if it is lent free of
charge, does that equate to physical presence in the buyer's state? Probably not. See Quill
Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992) (discussing the location in North Dakota of
Quill's floppy disks).
53. This again refers to the sale of digitized items for delivery entirely on-line, which may
not require a bill-to or a ship-to address, based on the form of payment and delivery.
54. See 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 5, 1 13.11.
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C.

Constitutionaland Judicial Limits on State Taxing Powers

The first barrier to state taxation of out-of-state sellers is the
United States Constitution. Under the Constitution,5 5 states may not
tax out-of-state sellers unless the imposition of the tax meets the Due
Process Clause requirement of minimum contacts and the Commerce
Clause requirement of physical presence. The United States Supreme
Court has stated 6 that the Constitution requires the existence of some
minimum contact (nexus) and some level of purposeful availment of
the state's benefits and protections by the taxpayer before the Due
Process Clause will be satisfied and taxation can occur.
1.

Due Process Clause Generally

The Due Process Clause5 7 ensures fundamental fairness in the
operations of the state governments towards its citizens. One must
not be deprived of "life, liberty, or property,"58 including tax dollars,
without due process of law. Due Process has been interpreted in this
context as requiring that a taxpayer have at least some minimum
contact with a jurisdiction, "such that the maintenance of a suit [or, in
this case a tax] does not offend the 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."' 5 9 The Due Process analysis centers on
whether a taxpayer's connections with the jurisdiction are sufficient
to give notice that it may be haled into court, or subject to a tax, in
that jurisdiction.60 For present purposes, the Due Process Clause
requires that a seller meet minimum thresholds of activity (which
need not equate to physical presence) with a state before that state
55. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967)
(holding that an Illinois use tax statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause and created an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce). The Court imposed
the minimum contact requirement in the context of Due Process.
56. See id.
57. The Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution (Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments) state: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
58. Id.
59. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The Court found
that due process requires that a defendant have minimum contacts with the jurisdiction. The
taxpayer's activities were systematic, continuous and resulted in a large amount of business from
within the state, thereby justifying taxation in the state.
60. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985). The Court held that if
one purposefully engages in significant economic activities in the state, he "manifestly [avails]
himself of the privilege of conducting business there," and "because his activities are subject to
the 'benefits and protections' of the forum's laws it is presumptively not unreasonable to require
him to submit to the burdens of litigation in that forum as well." Id.
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can impose a tax on the seller, or an obligation to collect that tax from
in-state buyers. 61 However, even if a taxpayer exceeds the Due
Process limitation, it must also exceed the physical presence
requirement of the Commerce Clause before taxation can occur.
2.

Commerce Clause Generally

The Commerce Clause is an express grant of power to Congress
to regulate commerce among the states.62 The Commerce Clause is
more restrictive than the Due Process Clause, in that it requires more
than a minimal connection with the taxing state before taxation can
occur. 63 The Commerce Clause requires that a taxpayer establish a

"substantial nexus," defined as physical presence with a state, before
the state can impose a tax. 64 However, the Commerce Clause has a
negative implication, the so-called "dormant Commerce Clause,"
which prohibits a state from taxing if the tax has the effect of
restraining interstate business. 6 The dormant Commerce Clause
allows Congress to prevent the states from imposing taxes that are
restrictive of interstate commerce. It also allows Congress to require
minimum standards, such as physical presence in the state, before
taxation can occur. 66 Congress could eliminate (or expand upon) the
judicially created physical presence test; but the minimum connection
required by the Due Process Clause, by contrast, can only be changed
by an amendment to the Constitution.67 Thus, while Congress may
not grant states the right to tax without at least the minimal
connection required by the Due Process Clause, the Commerce
61. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
However, it was not until the Court's ruling in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992),
that the distinction between Due Process (minimum connection) and Commerce Clause
(physical presence) nexus in this context was established.
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... to regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States .
.
63. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 309. Under the Articles of Confederation, the states levied taxes that operated as
competitive trade barriers between the states. The competition resulted in a lack of conformity
that hindered interstate and international trade. See 1 RICHARD POMP & OLIVER OLDMAN,
STATE & LOCAL TAXATION 1 1-1.5 (3d ed. 2000). The Commerce Clause, with its negative
sweep, was designed to rectify this situation. See Julie M. Buechler, Virtual Reality: Quill's
Physical Presence Requirement Obsolete When Cogitating Use Tax Collection in Cyberspace, 74
N.D. L. REV. 479 (1998) (outlining the development of the dormant Commerce Clause).
66. See Christina R. Edson, Quill's ConstitutionalJurisprudenceand Tax Nexus Standards
in an Age of Electronic Commerce, 49 TAX LAW. 893, 937 (1996) (stating that the Commerce
Clause protects national economic interests by prohibiting state restrictions, such as a sales tax,
on interstate commerce).
67. Id. at 940.
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Clause gives Congress the ability to legislate a more or less restrictive
requirement than physical presence. 68 In part because Congress has
not legislated in the sales tax arena under the Commerce Clause, 69 the

Supreme Court has stepped in to create a four-pronged test7° to
determine if a state tax violates the Commerce Clause restrictions.
3.

Judicial Interpretations

71
The Supreme Court held in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady
that a tax imposed by a state must meet the following four-pronged

test to withstand Commerce Clause scrutiny. The tax must (1) apply
to a taxpayer with a "substantial" nexus with the taxing state; (2) be
fairly apportioned; (3) not discriminate against interstate commerce;
and (4) be fairly related to the services provided to the taxpayer by
the state. 72 This is the test applied to a state's imposition of a tax on an

out-of-state seller to determine if the tax will unduly restrict interstate
commerce. To date, the majority of litigation arising out of the
Complete Auto Transit test has focused on the definition of the

substantial nexus requirement of prong one, 7374leading to the creation
of the physical presence requirement of Quill.
a.

National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois
In 1967, the Supreme Court first applied the dual analysis of the

Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause to a tax imposed on
an out-of-state mail-order seller,75 a form of interstate commerce very
similar to an Internet seller. In NationalBellas Hess ("Bellas Hess"),
the Court struck down Illinois's attempt to impose a collection
68. Id.
69. It has, however, done so in the state income tax arena: the Interstate Commerce Tax
Act § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1959), commonly known as Public Law 86-272, limits the ability of
the various states to impose income taxes on out-of-state sellers of tangible personal property.
70. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (setting forth the
physical presence requirement as a prerequisite to the legitimate exercise of state power). The
four-pronged test of Complete Auto still governs the validity of state taxes under the Commerce
Clause today.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 279.
73. But note that the fourth prong of this test requires fair relation of the tax to services
provided by the state to the taxpayer; imposing a collection obligation on a seller with minimal
sales into a state, and no physical presence, would not seem to be fairly related to the benefits
provided, and creating a nexus standard that does not require physical presence could run afoul
of the Complete Auto test. See Donald M. Griswold & Michael McLoughlin, Applying the
Commerce Clause to Electronic Commerce, 17 STATE TAX NOTES 757 (1999).
74. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
75. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Il1., 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
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obligation on Bellas Hess for the state's tax on its sales into Illinois.76
Bellas Hess was a mail-order seller with sales to customers
nationwide. Its principal place of business was Missouri, and it
77
consistently sold goods into Illinois from its Missouri location.
Bellas Hess did not have a physical presence in Illinois; it did not
maintain an office, employ agents or salespeople in Illinois, nor did it
own property or have a telephone listing in Illinois.78 Bellas Hess
personnel did not enter the state for maintenance, installation or
other service on its products. 79 The sole contact Bellas Hess had with
Illinois was through the continual use of the United States mail.
Catalogs were mailed into the state on a regular basis, and any orders
for merchandise were sent from Illinois to Missouri, where they were
accepted and filled from locations outside Illinois. All orders were
shipped via common carrier or the United States post. 80 Thus, Bellas
Hess did actively solicit business in Illinois, but did not have a
physical presence in Illinois.
The State of Illinois argued that Bellas Hess had established a
minimal connection with Illinois, and should therefore be subject to
the law that required the collection of Illinois's tax. 81 Under the
relevant Illinois statute, any "retailer maintaining a place of
business" 82 in the state was required to collect the tax. That clause
was further defined to include a retailer that was "engaging in
soliciting orders within this State from users by means of catalogs...
whether such orders are received or accepted within or without this
state. '83 Illinois asserted that it had provided a market for Bellas
Hess to exploit, and Bellas Hess therefore owed Illinois this collection
duty.84
In rejecting Illinois's argument, the Court found a tension in the
Commerce Clause between the free trade zone created by the
federation of states and the need for merchants engaged in that free
trade zone to pay their own way. 85 In a later attempt to balance these
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 760.
Id. at 754.
Id.
Id. at 754-55.
Id. at 755.
Id. at 754.
See 120 ILL. COMP. STAT. 439/2 (West 1965).
See National Bellas Hess, Inc., 386 U.S. at 755.
Illinois had provided something "for which it can ask [for something in] return." Id. at

756.
85. Id. at 757.
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conflicting provisions, the Court set forth the four-pronged test of
86

Complete Auto Transit.
The Court found that the touchstone of Due Process was

fairness, 87 requiring "some definite link, some minimum connection"
between the state and Bellas Hess. 8 Taxability required something

more than a simple exploitation of the market created by Illinois; it
required that an out-of-state seller establish a physical presence
within the taxing state in order to establish a sufficient taxing nexus. 89
The Court made note of the distinction between the taxpayer's
physical presence in the state and a presence established solely by
common carrier or United States mail. This distinction created a safe

basis for companies to follow in planning expansion activities, which
would re-appear in the Court's later reasoning 9° as a rationale for
maintaining the bright-line 91 physical presence requirement for

taxable nexus.
b.

State of North Dakota v. Quill Corp.

Two generations of mail-order companies later, the Court again
addressed the physical presence requirement in State of North Dakota

v. Quill Corp.92 In Quill, the Supreme Court declined to eliminate the
bright-line physical presence test established in Bellas Hess and
adhered to the rule that taxpayers had been relying on for twenty-five

years: that physical presence with a state was required before taxation
could occur. 93
The facts of Quill are similar to those of Bellas Hess. Quill was a
mail-order seller of office supplies and equipment, 94 with no physical
presence in North Dakota.95 The state imposed a use tax collection

86. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
87. See National Bellas Hess, Inc., 386 U.S. at 756; see also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,
504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992).
88. Id. (quoting Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954)).
89. See National Bellas Hess, Inc., 386 U.S. at 759. It did not, at this stage, differentiate
between the requirements of the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause, but revisited
this issue in Quill.
90. See Quill, 504 U.S. 298.
91. However, see discussion herein on the not-so-bright line test the interpretation of
physical presence has created.
92. 504 U.S. 298.
93. Id. at 312.
94. Id. at 302. Quill was the sixth largest vendor of office products in North Dakota, and
sold over $1 million worth of goods to 3000 customers inNorth Dakota.
95. Id. But see id. at 315 n.8: Quill owned a few disks which buyers used to check inventory
levels and prices at Quill's headquarters. The Court determined that although "title to 'a few
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obligation on Quill, claiming that Quill was a "retailer maintaining a
place of business" in North Dakota. 96 The state acknowledged that
Quill did not meet the physical presence requirement of Bellas Hess,
but argued that it did have a significant economic presence in North
Dakota, sufficient to require Quill to collect tax on items sold into
North Dakota. 97

The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed that

Bellas Hess was obsolete, based on the changes in society and the
mail-order industry since 1967.98 The Supreme Court responded by
clarifying its prior ruling in Bellas Hess99 and refined the distinction
between the Due Process and Commerce Clause requirements. 1°°
The Quill Court indicated that the Due Process analysis strayed
from the physical presence requirement, speaking more to a minimal
connection that seemed to embrace North Dakota's economic
presence argument. The Due Process Clause did not require a
physical presence before a state could impose its tax: "the
requirements of due process are met irrespective of an [out-of-state
seller's] lack of physical presence in the taxing State." 101 Therefore,
since Quill had directed its activities towards North Dakota with an
intention to profit therefrom, under a pure Due Process analysis the
tax was fairly imposed.
However, the Court decided while physical presence is not
required under the Due Process Clause, it is still required under the
Commerce Clause.tm In a vain attempt to prevent future confusion,
the Court explicitly stated that "a[n out-of-state seller] whose only
contact with the taxing State is by mail or common carrier lacks the
'substantial nexus' required by the Commerce Clause."103 The Court
specifically upheld an important part of its ruling in Bellas Hess by
emphasizing the "continuing vitality of Bellas Hess' sharp distinction
floppy diskettes' ... might constitute some minimal nexus... [that] does not meet the
'substantial nexus' requirement of the Commerce Clause."
96. Id. at 302.
97. Id. at 303.
98. Id. Note the similarities between the rapid changes in the mail-order industry and
changes in the Internet selling industry.
99. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of IlL, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
100. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 305.
101. Id. at 308.
102. It was not an easy decision, nor one that the Court was terribly pleased with. It was not
the overpowering logic of the rule that persuaded the court to maintain it, but rather the
following litany of reasons: 1) the administrative advantages of the physical presence rule; 2) the
reliance on it by taxpayers and states; 3) stare decisis; 4) problems with the application of a
different standard; and 5) the superior ability of Congress to fix what the Courts cannot. See id.
at 318. The same concerns still plague Internet sellers.
103. See id. at 311.
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between mail-order [sellers] with a physical presence in a taxing
state" and those without such a physical presence. 1°4 Thus, since Quill

did not have the requisite physical presence, North Dakota's tax was
unconstitutional as a restriction on interstate commerce and a
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. 10

The physical presence standard remains in force, and is the
standard applied currently to all remote sellers, Internet sellers
included. But defining exactly what qualifies as physical presence has
proven to be a formidable task. The Court in Quill noted that a "few
floppy diskettes" did not rise to the level of physical presence, 1°6 but
did not offer much beyond that.107 At its extremes, defining physical
presence does not pose a problem. A company that is headquartered
in a state, conducts all of its business in that state, and has all its

property and sales activity in that state clearly has a physical presence
in that state. It is just as easy to say that this company does not have a
taxable presence in any other state.
But in the much more realistic penumbra, physical presence
becomes far more amorphous, and the only clear rule to emerge from
the foray thus far is that any physical connection, no matter how
slight, could equate to physical presence.108 Physical presence is
established with only a temporary physical presence in a state, 10 9 and

repeated trips by sales or service personnel into a state, even if
unrelated to the company's sales into the state, can also constitute
physical presence." 0

The relevance is obvious; without a clear

104. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
105. The Court revisited this in Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep't. of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358
(1991), where it reestablished that a state tax may be consistent with due process and yet unduly
burden interstate commerce.
106. See Quill, 504 U.S. 298.
107. See TEXAS ALT HEARING 37,473 (Apr. 1, 1999) (indicating that a modem and
telecommunications equipment, along with an employee whose sole responsibility was to
maintain the equipment, was sufficient to give a company taxable nexus in Texas). But see N.Y.
DEP'T OF TAX'N & FIN., TSB-A-00(1)S (Jan 21, 2000) (indicating that an out-of-state company's
use of New York based independent contractors to accept orders and perform customer service
over the phone did not create sales and use tax nexus).
108. See Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960) (finding agency nexus based on an nonemployee resident salesperson); see also Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington Dep't of
Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987) (finding nexus based on the permanent presence of a
representative in state).
109. See B.L. Key, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 934 P.2d 1164, 1168 (Utah Ct. App.
1997).
Ct. App., No. 1-98-1476 (2000),
110. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, I11.
where an unstaffed office, rented solely for the purpose of registering the company under a
regulatory trucking plan, was sufficient to give the taxpayer a taxable presence in Illinois for
income tax purposes. However, note the recent recommendations of the ACEC that such
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definition of what qualifies as physical presence, Internet sellers will

have a difficult time determining where they are subject to tax."'
How the physical presence standard will be applied to Internet sellers

with sales activity across the nation remains largely unanswered,11 but
Congress did not fail to recognize its importance when it passed the
ITFA.
D. The Internet Tax Freedom Act
The ITFA was signed into law by President Clinton on October

21, 1998 and is effective from October 1, 1998 to October 21, 2001.113
The ITFA imposes a moratorium against any new state and local tax
liability on consumers or sellers of products sold over the Internet."4
The ITFA created the Advisory Commission on Electronic

Commerce ("ACEC")11s which will recommend a sales tax structure
6

regarding the Internet to Congress."
The ITFA does not restrict state and local authorities from
collecting any non-discriminatory sales or Internet access taxes that
were in place before October 21, 1998.117 Jurisdictions are permitted
to impose tax on all e-business sales, provided that the tax rate is the
same as that which would have been imposed had the transaction
activity not create physical presence. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON ELEC. COMMERCE, supra
note 5, at 22.
111. See MULTISTATE TAX COMM'N, NEXUS GUIDELINE (DRAFT) FOR APPLICATION OF A
TAXING STATE'S SALES AND USE TAX TO A REMOTE SELLER (Jan. 25, 1995)
<http://www.webcom.com/software/issues/docs-htm/mtc-nxs2.html> (listing out the activities
that would give an out-of-state seller nexus with any given state under this proposal). See also
the recommendations for nexus guidelines in ADVISORY COMM'N ON ELEC. COMMERCE, supra
note 5, at 22.
112. Moreover, where the sale actually occurs is itself subject to interpretation. See Yancey
et al., supra note 4, at 265 (listing fifteen possible locations of an Internet sale, including the
location of the sales authorization center, credit authorization, and buyer's accounts payable
location).
113. See Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1102, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1998). Recent indications are,
however, that the termination date could be pushed back another five years. See ADVISORY
COMM'N ON ELEC. COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 18.

114. See Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1102, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1998).
115. See id. § 1004. The ACEC has nineteen members; three from the federal government,
eight from state and local government, and eight from various industries. It met at various times
over eighteen months and will submit its recommendations to Congress.
116. See id.; see also ADVISORY COMM'N ON ELEC. COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 11.
However, the decisions recently announced by the ACEC are by no means unanimous. See,
e.g., Comm'rs Joseph Guttentag et al., Statement Submitted to the Advisory Commission on
Electronic Commerce, BNA TAX CORE, Mar. 31, 2000 (suggesting that the Commission's
proposals are based on less than the supermajority count required by Congress).
117. See Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1004(2), 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1998); see also ADVISORY
COMM'N ON ELEC. COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 18 (recommending invalidating all such access
taxes).
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been conducted in a traditional manner, such as by mail-order. States
are therefore free to continue to impose their ordinary sales taxes on
all taxable sales of tangible personal property over the Internet, just
as if those sales were conducted via mail-order or over-the-counter.
It is the difficulty with collection, rather than imposition, that causes
the states such concern.
The ITFA also calls on the Clinton administration to demand
that foreign governments keep the Internet free of all taxes and
tariffs." 8 The ACEC is charged with studying not only Internet
sellers, but also all remote sellers -including mail-order sellers, so its
recommendations on nexus will be far reaching. 119 The ITFA
indicates that nexus will still be determined based on traditional
methods (physical presence), and the activities of Internet sellers will
establish nexus in the same manner as other sellers. 12 0 The ITFA
addresses two situations in which an Internet seller can theoretically
create nexus with a state: an in-state resident's ability to access a
seller's Web site, and the presence of a seller's computer server in the
state. 2 ' Under the ITFA, states may not require an out-of-state seller
to collect sales tax if "the sole ability to access a site on a remote
seller's out-of-state computer server is considered a factor in
determining a remote seller's tax collection obligation."'2 Thus, the
fact that a seller's Web site is accessible from within the state is itself
insufficient to give the seller physical presence in that state.
The ITFA does not change the rules, however; it only prevents
the creation of new ones. Accordingly, before the ITFA, any physical
presence in a state was sufficient to create nexus, and under the ITFA
the same holds true. Thus, if a remote seller's server must be an "outof-state computer server"' 123 for taxation to be improper, the reverse
seems true by implication. 2 4 If an out-of-state server cannot create
118. Not to stop at that, some members of Congress wish to prohibit worldwide imposition
of tax on Internet commerce (in the wake of allowing worldwide nuclear testing).
119. See47 U.S.C. § 151.
120. Indeed, to impose a different standard on Internet sellers vis-A-vis other remote sellers,
based solely on the nature of the sales, would likely give rise to Equal Protection problems.
121. See 47 U.S.C. § 151.
122. See id. A similar rule applies under the ITFA when a seller's Web site is hosted on an
ISP's Web server.
123. See id.
124. See Carey R. Ramos & Curtis Carmack, Beware of Cyberspace Marauders: Internet
Security Addressed, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 24, 1997, at $1. The Internet is a huge, multinational
interconnected network of networks, which allows users to access Web sites from any connected
computer terminal in the world. Most users access the Internet from Internet Service Providers
("ISPs"). The same ISPs may also provide Web site hosting for an Internet seller's Web site.
This hosting is generally conducted via a computer server, which could be located in any state,
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nexus, an in-state server seemingly can create nexus. Without a
specific exemption,'21 even if the seller's only physical presence in the
state is its computer server, that will suffice as taxable presence for
126
Commerce Clause nexus.

Under either the ITFA or the traditional physical presence
standard, an Internet seller must know what will subject it to a tax
collection responsibility in any given state. Clarity, more than

anything else, is vital-and physical presence best provides that
clarity.
II. AN ARGUMENT FOR STATE TAXATION OF E-BUSINEss BASED
ON THE QUILL STANDARD OF PHYSICAL PRESENCE

A.

CongressionalAcceptance of the PhysicalPresence Standardfor
E-Business

Sales tax nexus should continue to be based on the physical
presence standard set forth in Quill, and Congress should adopt a
nationwide standard of sales tax imposition based on the taxpayer's
physical presence in the taxing state. 127 The physical presence
standard has been the law for many years, 128 and will remain so until

Congress acts to change it. Physical presence works-and if it ain't
broke, don't fix it. Taxpayers, mail-order and Internet alike, rely on it
for "settled expectations"129 in tax planning and compliance, as do the
states; any change in the standard would result in many taxpayers
finding themselves taxable in far more states than they planned for.130
and is essentially a computerized switchboard that handles the site and maintains connectivity.
It is the location of this switchboard that is at issue.
125. Some states currently exempt such items from creating nexus, and the number may
increase as the states realize the difficulty of avoiding such connection.
126. The easy way around this, of course, is to ensure that your server is located in your
home state, where nexus is already established, or locate the server in a nontaxing state.
127. See Thomas Bonnett, Technological Change and Tax Policy: The Future of State and
Local Tax Structures, 6 Gov'T FIN. REv. 14 (1998) (describing how a state tax system should be
structured, and explaining that fairness, equity, and ease of compliance are important).
128. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
129. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 316 (1992).
130. See Douglas J. Derito & Carter Sanrtos, State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, CORP.
Bus. TAX'N MONTHLY, Jan. 2000, at 18. To address all suggestions, let alone describe them
with any detail, would fill tomes. They include an economic presence based nexus, which would
change the physical presence standard to one of economic presence -company's sales into the
state, even without any physical contact, would equate to taxable nexus; an agency-based nexus,
which would give Internet sellers nexus anywhere that an agent of the seller, such as AOL, had
the requisite physical presence; and Web site-based nexus, which would give a seller nexus
anywhere its Web site could be accessed. Writ large, this last concept could subject an Internet
seller to taxation in every jurisdiction in the world that has Internet access.
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Congress should codify the Quill standard of physical presence, and
include therein a de minimis exception for insignificant or accidental

physical presence in a state that will not create taxable nexus.'
State taxes are a major cost of doing business in America, and
tax planning is a vital practice of any multistate company. 132 The

physical presence standard provides taxpayers with an unchanging
and easily verifiable guideline as to what will create taxable nexus,
allowing them to plan their activities to maximize profitability.

33

Under some other nexus standard, such as economic presence, such
planning would be severely restricted, as taxability could occur

without the taxpayer being cognizant of it or planning for it. With an
economic presence standard, a taxpayer would not need to establish a
physical presence in a state before imposition of a collection
obligation would be constitutional; all that is theoretically required is
a single sale into the state.1 34 What qualifies as sufficient economic
presence is not clear,'35 but a low threshold would cause sellers to be

constantly concerned with sales levels into every state, further adding
to the compliance burden. This standard first appeared (and was
rejected) in the argument put forth by Illinois in National Bellas Hess,
and repeated by North Dakota in Quill.136 How such a standard
131. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318-19.
132. See Cline & Neubig, supra note 34, at 18 (listing compliance costs as ranging between
$1,200 and $6,800 per jurisdiction, per year). Compliance costs could equate to 18% of sales
taxes collected.
133. It should be added that the physical presence standard is also something that foreign
companies selling into the U.S. use to determine taxability. The problem of determining nexus
is hard enough for a domestic company; a foreign company would be even less able to navigate
the taxability maze with some other standard, and the nature of e-business means that it will
cross international borders much more readily that other forms of commerce. Subjecting
foreign entities that do not have even the slightest physical presence to a collection obligation
could result in the company simply not selling to American buyers, a bad answer for the
consumer. How the states would enforce such an obligation is a bit of a mystery as well.
134. The following states impose an economic nexus based collection obligation on out-ofstate sellers: Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and
Virginia. These laws, of course, are unenforceable. See COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE,
MULTISTATE SALES TAX GUIDE 2701 (1993).
135. See Buechler, supra note 65, at 499 (arguing for an economic presence test, that would
"modernize" the current Commerce Clause physical presence test). Economic presence could
be based on as little as a single sale into a state; this new test would "remove a competitive
disadvantage for local merchants." Id. Sounds like the devil we know might be better than the
one we don't know.
136. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318. The North Dakota department of revenue made virtually
the same argument, with the mail-order business, by showing that Quill was the sixth largest
seller of office goods in North Dakota, with $6 million in sales, giving it economic presence
without physical presence.
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would simplify sales tax collection or compliance, from either the
13 7
seller or the state's perspective is unclear.

Congress's power to impose a physical presence requirement is
undisputed. 138 In reaffirming the physical presence standard of its
Bellas Hess holding, the Quill Court expressly noted that Congress

had the power to overrule Quill in an affirmative exercise of its
Commerce Clause power.1 39 Congress has been successful in its
imposition of a national standard before; 140 in 1959, Congress enacted
Public Law (PL) 86-272,'14 which prohibits any state from imposing an

income tax unless the taxpayer exceeds certain thresholds of activity
in the state.1 42 The Supreme Court has interpreted PL 86-272 to be
little more than a physical presence standard, with a de minimis
exception and a focus on the taxpayer's activity in the state. 143 Under
this Congressionally imposed standard, the mere physical presence of
144
the taxpayer does not necessarily equate to a taxable presence.

While this criteria applies to state income tax nexus, it could just as
easily and successfully apply to state sales tax nexus.
Congress' physical presence requirement for sales tax nexus
should explicitly include the judicially recognized de minimis
exception.' 41 This exception grants immunity from taxation if physical
137. Indeed, if it worked the states could be flooded with returns, remitting such small
amounts that the costs to process each return could exceed the revenues generated therefrom.
138. Note that a majority of the commission members suggested a formal congressional
solution to the nexus problem. This proposal would restrict states from imposing sales taxes on
electronic merchants unless the seller had a substantial physical presence in the state under
Quill. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON ELEC. COMMERCE, BUSINESS CAUCUS PROPOSAL (Mar. 20,
2000) <http://www.ecommercommission.org/document/202BusinessCaucusProposal.pdf>.
139. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318-19. The Court noted that Congress is better qualified to
address the Commerce Clause issue, and has the power to do so. Specifically, the Court stated
that "in this situation, it may be that the better part of both wisdom and valor is to respect the
judgment of the other branches of the Government." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
140. See Kathryn L. Moore, State and Local Taxation: When Will Congress Intervene?, 23 J.
LEGIS. 171, 183 (1998) (discussing Congress's attempts to date to pass sales tax bills and why
they didn't work out just the way they should have); see also Griswold & McLoughlin, supra
note 73, at 763 (lamenting Congress's repeated shunning of the Consumer and Main Street
Protection Act (a.k.a., the Bumpers Bill), which would have allowed states, with certain
restrictions, to impose use tax collection responsibility on out-of-state mail-order sellers).
141. The Interstate Commerce Tax Act § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1959) provides that a state
may not impose a net income tax on any person if that person's only business activities within
such state involve the solicitation of orders approved and filled from outside of the state.
142. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON ELEC. COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 19. The thresholds
would be even further expanded under this proposal, which recommends the same nexus
requirements for income tax as for sales tax.
143. See William Wrigley, Jr., Co. v. Wisconsin, 505 U.S. 214 (1992); any activity within a
state that is not entirely ancillary to the solicitation of sales is sufficient to give the taxpayer
nexus with that state under PL 86-272.
144. Id. at 225.
145. See National Governor's Association, Leading Tax Experts Oppose Permanent
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presence constitutes merely a trivial connection with the state. The
Supreme Court has defined the exception as "de minimis... depends

upon whether that activity establishes a nontrivial additional
connection with the taxing State. 1 46 The de minimis exception as
applied to sales tax would except such physical presence in a state as a

computer server or the presence of a corporate officer on unrelated
business. Such a scheme would not tax out-of-state companies that
have minimal physical presence in a state and cannot readily control
1 47
sales into the state.
Physical presence with a de minimis exemption is the highest
conceivable nexus standard that states would accept. Its adoption
would reduce the number of taxpayers falling under the states'
collection umbrella, by increasing the level of protected activities.48

On the other end of this spectrum is a standard that creates nexus
based on Web site accessibility from within a state, 149 which
theoretically could allow every state to tax any and every company
with a Web site.5 0 The inherent unfairness of this standard would
Exemption for Electronic Commerce (visited Feb. 11, 2000) <http.//www.nga.org/internet/
conRelease.asp> (quoting Charles McLure, an economist with the Hoover Institution at
Stanford University: "It is extremely important to provide a de minimis rule or use other
techniques to eliminate compliance burdens on small business.").
146. See Wrigley, 505 U.S. at 225.
147. By way of contrast, the economic presence test would; any activity in a state, including
sales, could theoretically provide a basis for the state to impose a sales tax collection obligation.
Thus, a small seller may shy away from selling into a state due to the added burden of
compliance, while a large seller with the financial prowess to absorb such costs would not
hesitate. Raising the barrier to enter a market via the Internet seems like killing the goose
that's laying the golden eggs. See National Governor's Association, supra note 2 (regarding
increased sales due to Internet activity).
148. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON ELEC. COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 17 (indicating that
physical presence, while remaining the standard, should not be determined based on such things
as the placement of digital data on an in-state server, performance of services in the state, or a
contractual relationship with an in-state entity allowing customers to return goods bought over
the internet to the other party's physical location in the state). All of these elements could
create physical presence, so the proposal actually decreases the number of taxpayers that have
nexus in any given state.
149. See Zippo Manufacturing Company v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D.
Pa. 1997) (differentiating between an interactive Web site and a passive Web site and finding
the interactive site creates a minimal Due Process connection). But see Cybersell v. Cybersell
Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that an Internet advertisement alone was insufficient
to create personal jurisdiction in another state); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937
F.Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding posted information on a Web site was insufficient for
personal jurisdiction).
150. Case law tends to indicate that such a standard could be feasible. See GTE New Media
Services Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that a Web site was
highly interactive and the quality and nature was significant enough for personal jurisdiction);
see also Hasbro Inc. v. Clue Computing Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that an
interactive Web site allowing residents of the forum to send e-mail to the defendant was
sufficient for personal jurisdiction).
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likely run afoul of other restraints on state tax, such as the Equal
152
Protection Clause 15, and the Complete Auto Transit test.
B.

States Should Cooperate to Design a Simple, Efficient Tax
Collection System That Does Not Prejudice E-Business

Along with the physical presence requirement, Congress should
encourage the state and the taxpayers to reduce the sales tax
compliance burden, making it easier to collect and remit sales and use
taxes. 53 If the Internet must give rise to new state tax laws, then let
those laws be tax simplification measures. States should increase tax
collection efforts by increasing and directing their audit staff to focus
on the fastest-growing portion of the escaping tax base: the in-state
individual consumers. 5 4 States could also remove the audit stick and
fatten the carrot by negotiating with Internet sellers to voluntarily
collect the tax even without the requisite physical presence, in
exchange for a larger share of the proceeds. 55 Since the primary
objection to sales tax collection by sellers is un-reimbursed costs,156
making the administration easier will obviously reduce costs and
increase taxpayer satisfaction and compliance.157 Centering the
collection of both state and local taxes in one agency would not only
reduce the burden on the seller by requiring only one return, but may
8
also increase state efficiency.5
The states are not blind to these concerns, and one proposal
offers the following incentives: standardized administrative
procedures; reduced costs of compliance, payment, and audits;
eliminated rate and base monitoring and implementation; and
eliminated costs of bad debts, audit liabilities, and negligence

151. U.S. CONST. art. I, amend. XIV.
152. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
153. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON ELEC. COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 26 (listing as one of its
recommendations that Congress "encourage state and local governments to work with and
through the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in drafting a
Uniform Sales and Use Tax Act that would simplify state and local sales and use taxation
policies so as to" simplify collection efforts).
154. See Cline & Neubig, supra note 34, at 4 (indicating the level of sales tax lost due to
individual consumers purchasing over the Internet).
155. See id. at 28 (listing vendor discounts that states currently offer for collection costs,
ranging from zero to 3.3%).
156. See id. at 5.
157. None of the discussion about "federally un-funded mandates" imposed on the states
has trickled over into the "state un-funded mandates" of sales tax collection imposed on sellers.
158. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON ELEC. COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 17-18.
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penalties. 51 9

Nonetheless, even without these measures, as the

following example shows, the advent of the Internet does not limit the
states in their collection attempts, and it does not serve as a drain on
state sales tax revenues. 16°

III. MAIL-ORDER SELLERS V. INTERNET SELLERS-THE SAME
RULES CAN APPLY IN PRACTICE

A.

Porcupinethe Mail-OrderSeller

The same physical presence standard that applies to mail-order
sellers can successfully apply to Internet sellers as well. The following
example shows the viability of the congressional codification of Quill

made in Part III. It shows that states really do not lose sales tax
revenues due to e-business sales, 6' and the Quill standard of physical
presence, even without a de minimis standard, can easily and
162
successfully accommodate Internet sellers.
To begin, imagine a hypothetical mail-order company,

163
Porcupine, which has its only place of business in Dekalb, Illinois.

Porcupine is a small mail-order seller of rare books to collectors in all
fifty states. Porcupine solicits sales by sending out, semi-annually, a
catalog that shows the various books for sale by Porcupine, including

the

edition,

publisher,

copyright

date,

condition,

and

other

information.
To facilitate orders and allow for customer ease, Porcupine

provides repeat buyers with access to its inventory database via
Porcupine's Web site, which allows the exchange of information over
the Internet, but does not allow buyers to purchase Porcupine's books
159. See National Governor's Association, supra note 37.
160. The physical presence standard is what is applied currently, and note the conclusion of
the National Conference of State Legislatures' analysis of 1999 revenues, that the states are
"generally in good to excellent fiscal condition."
NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, STATE FISCAL OUTLOOK FOR

2000, Jan. 5, 2000. This report indicates that

twenty states "will exceed initial revenue expectations" and "29 states and the District of
Columbia anticipate that revenue collections will be on target with estimates." Essentially,
forty-nine of the fifty states lost nothing due to e-commerce; many increased tax revenues.
161. See Cline & Neubig, supra note 3, at 10 (stating that the sales tax dollars "lost" by the
states are grossly overstated, and the uncollected sales tax revenues in 1998 did not exceed $170
million); see also Austan Goolsbee & Jonathan Zittrain, Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of
Taxing Internet Commerce, 5 NAT'L TAX J. 1 (1999) (suggesting that the total uncollected taxes
resulting from Internet sales will be less than 2% of all sales tax revenue in 2003).
162. The de minimis standard, however, would certainly make nexus determinations easier.
163. Imagine also that Congress has codified the Quill standard of physical presence without
an explicit exemption for de minimis activities in the forum state. Thus, the example will
assume that even the slightest physical presence is sufficient for sales tax nexus.
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on-line. A server located in California maintains the Web site. All

employees live and work exclusively in Illinois, with the exception of
certain buyers, who travel to a number of different states to attend
used book sales. When a recipient of Porcupine's catalog wants a
particular book, they call Porcupine's toll-free number to place their

order. The order is shipped to the buyer via common carrier or the
U.S. mail. If the buyer wants later services for his purchase, such as
re-conditioning, he must send the book back to Porcupine's office in
Illinois. None of Porcupine's re-conditioners travel out-of-state and
all services on the rare books are performed in Illinois.
Using these facts, five different scenarios will highlight the
application of the Quill standard of physical presence to mail-order
sellers, as well as reveal some of the difficulties in calculating and
collecting the tax that these and all remote sellers face. The five sales

are to residents of Illinois, Missouri, California, and Louisiana.
Similar hypotheticals will also highlight the ease with which the states,
using the same Quill physical presence standard, can continue to
capture the sales tax on e-commerce sales to in-state buyers.
The first buyer, Polly, located in Illinois, has a ship-to address in
Dekalb, Illinois, the same city as Porcupine's offices and warehouse.
Under Illinois law, all sales' 64 by Porcupine to Illinois buyers are
subject to Illinois sales tax 165 at the rate of six and one-quarter percent
of the retail purchase price,' 66 based on Porcupine's Dekalb
location. 167 Illinois is what is referred to as an "order acceptance

point" state, meaning that the proper sales tax rate to be charged by
the seller is based not on where the item is being shipped to, but
rather where the order was accepted. 168 Thus, if the second buyer,

164. Assuming rare books are taxable at all; some states may allow for exemptions for items
such as antiques, or the books may qualify as educational materials, also exempt in many states.
See 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. §120/2 (West 1986) (exempting certain educational materials).
165. This becomes important in the discussion of taxable buyers as well; even if the books
are ordinarily taxable, they may be exempt if sold for educational purposes, even if bought by a
private school that is itself taxable under IRS rules. See I.R.C. § 501 (1996). The myriad rules
only muddy the waters more.
166. Even this is not so clear. Illinois is a home rule state, allowing each taxable jurisdiction
(including school, utility and "entertainment" jurisdictions) to impose their own sales taxes on
sales of tangible personal property, increasing the base rate to as much as 9.75%. The
determination of the correct rate is based on the order acceptance point. Tax rate depends on
where the order is filled from, as opposed to where it is shipped. Thus, a warehouse in Chicago
would mean a seller must collect the highest tax rate in the state for all sales, regardless of
where in the state they are shipped. See Kenneth H. Silverberg & Mark M. Foster, The Internet
Tax Freedom Act: Will It Be a Success or a Failure?,J. MULTISTATE TAx'N 4 (1999).
167. See 35 ILL COMP. STAT. § 120/2 (West 1986) (imposing the tax on the sale of property).
168. See 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 5, 9114.02.
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Hot Rodder, lives in Chicago, where the applicable rate is eight and
three-quarters percent, 69 Porcupine will still only charge tax at six and
one-quarter percent, since the order is accepted in Dekalb, and not in
70
Chicago.
Even considering all the complexity and intricacies of Illinois's
sales tax scheme,' it is relatively easy for Porcupine to navigate these
72
sales tax waters so long as it remains solely within Illinois.
However, like all multistate sellers, Porcupine's sales and use tax
problems do not end in its home state. Porcupine sends its buyers out
of Illinois to various locations, including Missouri, to buy rare books
for Porcupine's inventory. 7 3 Porcupine buys much of its inventory
from Missouri sellers, 74 and occasionally sells books to Missouri
residents. The third buyer, Tom, is from Missouri. Tom calls
Porcupine's toll-free number and places his order, which is shipped
via U.S. mail to his home address in Missouri. Should Porcupine
charge sales tax on this sale? If so, at what rate?
Illinois's rate is improper, even considering the order acceptance
point theory, since this is a sale of goods in interstate rather than
intrastate commerce. While Illinois is free to tax goods sold to Illinois
buyers, it may not tax goods sold to Missouri buyers. So the rate, if
any, must be the Missouri rate-but can Missouri require that
Porcupine collect and remit the sales tax? To do so, Missouri must
show that Porcupine has exceeded the Due Process requirement of
minimal connection and the Commerce Clause requirement of
physical presence in Missouri. Since Porcupine does not have any
property in Missouri, does not have a sales office, and does not
actively solicit sales there, Porcupine would seem to have no physical
169. See 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 3-27-010 (West 1986) (imposing the Chicago sales tax on
sales of property taxable in Illinois).
170. However, if the order were filled from a warehouse in Chicago, the proper rate would
be Chicago's higher rate, regardless of where in the state the order is accepted, or where it is
shipped.
171. See Cline & Neubig, supra note 34, at 1 (calling state and local governments "masters of
complexity in designing sales tax systems").
172. Imagine, though, how difficult it would be for an out-of-state seller that has no physical
presence in Illinois, and thus is not collecting the tax, when it discovers that it is now over the
economic presence threshold and must begin collecting the tax.
173. Suppose Porcupine buys 15% of its inventory from Missouri; while that is a significant
amount, under the pure physical presence analysis, even buying one book in Missouri via an instate buyer would be sufficient for physical presence.
174. These purchases would likely be exempt from sales tax as sales for resale, assuming
Porcupine gives the booksellers the appropriate exemption documentation. The sales tax rests
solely on the end user, and is only imposed once, so a purchase of goods to be resold is usually
exempt from sales tax. See 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 5, 12.01.
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presence in Missouri, and would thus not be required to collect
Missouri's sales or use tax.
This, however, is incorrect;

Porcupine

does have physical

presence in Missouri, and can be required to collect Missouri's sales
tax on sales to Missouri buyers. The presence of Porcupine's buyers
in Missouri is sufficient to create physical presence under the Quill
standard. 175 This is so regardless of the level of sales volume directed
towards Missouri, be it one sale or one hundred percent of
Porcupine's revenues; once created, physical presence is an indelible
mark. 176 Tom should thus be charged the price of the book, plus 4.225
percent, 177 the applicable Missouri state use tax rate.

The fourth buyer, Casy, lives in California, the state where
Porcupine has its computer server. Porcupine does not send buyers
into California, and has no trace of physical presence there, other
than the computer server. 178 Like the other buyers, Casy calls in her

order to Dekalb, which is filled in Illinois and shipped to her
California home via U.S. mail. Under the basic Quill standard
requiring a physical presence, and the interpretation of the ITFA
discussed above, Porcupine has taxable nexus with California, due to

its server in the state, even though it has no other physical presence in
the state. The presence of the server equates to a taxable physical
presence,'7 9 and Porcupine must collect California tax on the sale to
Casy. 18°
The fifth buyer is Huck, who recently made his home in
Louisiana. Huck's order is billed without any sales tax included,
because Porcupine does not have nexus with Louisiana. Porcupine

has no property in Louisiana, does not send its buyers into Louisiana,
and maintains no inventory there. Porcupine may have exceeded the
minimum connection required by the Due Process Clause by
175. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992).
176. On an annual basis, anyway. It is doubtful that Missouri could continue to impose the
tax collection obligation on Porcupine in the year following Porcupine's last incidence of
physical presence, even if it continued to sell into Missouri.
177. See § 144.610.1, R.S.MO. (1995). Missouri sales tax rate is 4.225% and consists of a
general sales and use tax of 4%, a wildlife conservation tax of .125%, and a soil and water
conservation and park tax of .10%.
178. Assume Porcupine owns the server itself in this case. Note the nexus definition in the
ACEC's recent proposal that indicates the maintenance of digital information on a server not
owned by the taxpayer will not equate to physical presence. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON ELEC.
COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 20.
179. Again, this is assuming the state does not specifically exempt such items from creating
nexus.
180. 1993 CAL. STAT. §§ 6051, 6051.2.
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directing its activities towards Louisiana, perhaps even by advertising
there,181 but it has not exceeded the stricter Commerce Clause nexus
standard requiring physical presence. Louisiana has no basis under
Quill to impose a tax on Porcupine, and if the state wants the tax
owed on the book purchased by Huck it must collect the tax directly
from Huck himself.
Louisiana of course may do so with no
constitutional worries, pursuant to its use tax act,18 2 as this is now an
in-state use of the book. However, as mentioned above, most states
do not aggressively pursue consumer use tax liabilities, probably due
to the cost of such enforcement, preferring to place that burden on
the out-of-state (and out of voting power) sellers.83
There are three states where Porcupine has taxable nexus, based
on varying degrees of physical presence. In Illinois, Porcupine has a
clear physical presence and must collect the Illinois sales tax, based
on the order acceptance point, for all sales to Illinois residents.
Porcupine must also collect the statewide tax for all sales to Missouri
residents, due to the physical presence created by Porcupine's buyers
in the state. For all sales with a ship-to address in California,
Porcupine must collect tax, based on the physical presence created by
the location of Porcupine's computer server in California.
In
Louisiana, Porcupine has no collection responsibility since it has no
physical presence there. Louisiana must pursue the in-state buyer to
collect any tax owed. All of the states addressed have the ability to
ensure the collection of the sales tax on sales to in-state residents;
Illinois, Missouri, and California can impose the collection and
remittance duty on Porcupine, and Louisiana can collect the tax
directly from its own citizens.' 84 The same, of course, is true for all
other states in which Porcupine may do business.185
B.

Old Wine in a New Bottle-PorcupineBecomes an Internet Seller

So what aspect of the sales tax should change if Porcupine begins
selling over the Internet?
Absolutely nothing.
Suppose that
Porcupine decides that to compete with other rare booksellers, it
181. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 302.
182. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:302 (West 1997) (imposing tax on sales of tangible
personal property).
183. The initiation of some or all of the simplification measures discussed in Part III may
make the collection duty in this case far less burdensome.
184. Of course, so could Illinois, Missouri, and California, but it's far easier for those states
to impose this duty on Porcupine.
185. Clearly, the states that do not impose sales tax would not be interested.
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must become fully integrated with the Internet and must allow
potential buyers to complete sales entirely in cyberspace, via
Porcupine's Web site, www.pokeme.com. Accordingly, Porcupine
upgrades its Web site to allow for the placement and shipment of an
order entirely over the Internet. Porcupine continues to solicit sales
via the traditional means, i.e. the catalogs continue to be sent out
semi-annually, and the toll-free number remains fully operational, but
all five buyers switch to Internet ordering for their next purchase. By
taking each of the five scenarios in turn, it is evident that none of the
states lose tax revenues because of the Internet sales, 186 and the
Internet may in fact help the states increase their sales tax collections.
When Porcupine receives Polly's order, over the Internet, it will
contain her payment information and her ship-to address in Dekalb,
Illinois. With this ship-to address, Porcupine is able to determine
whether and at what rate to collect tax. Since the ship-to address will
show Illinois, Porcupine knows it must collect six and one-quarter
percent on the sales price of the book. The same is true when Hot
Rodder's order comes in, showing his ship-to address as Chicago,
Illinois. Porcupine again knows to charge the six and one-quarter
percent rate on the sale to Hot Rodder. 187 Porcupine's Internet
presence does not change the nature of its physical presence in
Illinois, and neither does it change the nature of its collection duty.
Tom, the Missouri resident, also places his next order over the
Internet. Porcupine refers to the ship-to address to determine the
taxability of the sale, and based on the Missouri address knows that it
must impose a Missouri tax on the sale to Tom. Again, Porcupine's
business did not change by the introduction of its Web site; the buyers
still visit book sales in Missouri, and this still gives Porcupine physical
presence in Missouri. The fact that the order is received via the
Internet, rather than over the telephone or by mail, does not change
the taxable nature of the sale. This is so regardless of the level of
sales Porcupine makes into Missouri; if Porcupine's Web site is a big

186. Again, it must be noted that this example assumes the sale of tangible personal
property that must be physically delivered somewhere; the invention of digitized music or
software that can be sold and downloaded over the Internet without a ship-to address
admittedly causes some problems. While a bill-to address may still be required, and credit card
payments have billing addresses, the advent of cyber cash, which could be completely
untraceable, can cause significant complications.
187. Note that if Porcupine's offices were in Chicago, the opposite would be true; Polly
would be charged 83/% sales tax, no matter that she lives in an area that charges only 64% and
that she may never visit Chicago and never enjoy any of the benefits that Chicago visits upon its
citizens due to its sales tax collections.
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hit with Missourians and sales multiply by 500 percent, Porcupine
must still collect and remit to Missouri the tax on all books shipped to
Missouri, notwithstanding that the buyer's activities remain the same
or may even decrease. However, if the buyers stopped traveling to
Missouri, and Porcupine severed its physical connection with
Missouri, Porcupine would no longer have the requisite physical
presence, and could cease collection and remittance of Missouri tax.
Considering Casy, the California buyer, here too nothing has
changed in the nature of the sales transaction. Casy's ship-to address
remains the same regardless of how she places her order, so
Porcupine knows that it must collect tax on the sale. 188 Porcupine
maintains its computer server in California, and barring a specific
state exemption, under the Quill standard and the ITFA the presence
of a computer server in the state is sufficient to create physical
presence. This is an obvious example of physical presence that should
qualify as de minimis under the proposed Congressional standard, but
even without such a de minimis exemption, the physical presence
standard at least allows for effective planning and collection by
Porcupine. On all sales to Casy or any other California resident,
Porcupine must collect the California tax. If Porcupine determined
that the compliance costs in California were too great to justify the
level of sales into California, it could move its server, or stop selling
to California customers, or seek to reduce its costs some other way;
but it would know it had physical presence and could plan around it.
Finally, Huck from Louisiana also orders over the Internet.
When his order is received, Porcupine goes through the same
analysis; refers to the ship-to address, and based on that determines if
it has a collection responsibility for Louisiana tax. Since nothing has
changed for Porcupine vis-A-vis Louisiana, nothing should change in
the taxability of sales to Louisiana residents. Porcupine still does not
have taxable presence in Louisiana, and Huck will continue to be
individually responsible to Louisiana for the tax owed on his
purchase. 189 Again, the same is true regardless of the level of sales

188. The state may collect from Porcupine the tax due on sales into the state if Porcupine
has physical presence, regardless of whether the buyer paid the tax to Porcupine. Since in this
case Porcupine bears both the collection and payment obligations, the incentive to collect when
nexus exists is great.
189. Note that under either a Web site-based standard or the agency standard for nexus
Porcupine would have a collection responsibility in all of Louisiana. The Web site is clearly
accessible from Louisiana, and if the company that maintains the server and the connection
agent has nexus with Louisiana, so too would Porcupine, under the agency nexus standard.
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volume that is actually sold to Louisiana residents; Porcupine does
not have physical presence and need not collect the Louisiana tax.
Louisiana also serves to illustrate the complexities that could
arise if any standard other than physical presence is used to create
sales tax nexus. Louisiana allows local jurisdictions, in addition to the
state, to impose and collect their own tax on sales of tangible personal
property into the local jurisdictions.19° These jurisdictions also have
their own administration of the local tax, which means that an out-ofstate seller with physical presence in the various local jurisdictions
would be required to collect the local tax and remit it by filing
multiple local returns, as well as the state return. 191 With the complex
questions that determine taxability, this could easily become a
mammoth task for the unsuspecting seller if nexus could be created
by something other than a physical presence. At the very least, a
small seller can control its exposure to the extent that it knows where
it has even the slightest physical presence. However, Porcupine may
be willing to voluntarily collect and remit the tax-for a small fee, of
course. Louisiana may also decide that the purchase of advertising
time on Porcupine's Web site, directed towards Louisiana residents
and informing them of their tax payment responsibility, is money well
spent.
From this example it is easy to see that while the advent of the
Internet and the increase of e-commerce will change the face and
magnitude of sales taxation and collection, the states will not be
crippled in their collection efforts. The new economy does not
destroy the old, and selling over the Internet does not change some of
the basic aspects of Porcupine's business. Buyers will still comb the
market for the best value, leaving a trail of taxability behind them as
they go.
Porcupine's inventory warehouses in various states,
necessary for the immediate delivery that the Internet promises, will
continue to create a physical presence in those states. Retail outlets,
which many Internet sellers use to supplement their Internet sales (or
vise versa), clearly create physical presence in a state, 192 as does the
location of a seller's delivery vehicles. Increased sales notwithstanding, the states are not soon to be deprived of all means or basis
190. See 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 5, 1 13.03.
191. Id. What is not so clear is if the seller has physical presence in one locality, does that
give it nexus with all localities in the state? See Yelverton's, Inc. v. Jefferson, Alabama, 23 Ala.
1961702 (1999) (addressing a similar issue in Alabama, finding that nexus in one locality does
not equate to nexus in another).
192. This is assuming the retail outlets are in the same corporate entity as the Internet seller.
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for collecting their sales taxes, and they really should consider
booming Internet sales a boon for their collection departments.
Physical presence is not only a workable standard for determining
sales tax nexus with Internet sellers; it is the best standard.
CONCLUSION

The rapidly expanding use of the Internet has caused increased
congressional and taxpayer scrutiny of the patchwork of rules that
current state sales taxation represents, but it need not cause broad,
sweeping changes in the way state sales tax is administered or
collected. The physical presence standard works and it can continue
to work; if it ain't broke, don't fix it. Congress should adopt the Quill
physical presence standard as the basic level of nexus required by an
out-of-state seller before a state can impose a tax collection
obligation. The standard should include a de minimis exception to
allow for minimal or incidental physical presence in a state, and allow
for accidental or temporary physical presence. It should be designed
to allow out-of-state sellers to plan their activities in such a way as to
be able to predict and maximize the value of their state tax exposure.
The current judicial standard of a mandatory significant physical
presence for state tax nexus, set out by the Supreme Court in Quill,
provides a solid, workable basis for the development of a
Congressional standard of sales tax nexus.
Such a standard would provide confidence and guidance to
Internet sellers, as well as other out-of-state sellers, about what
activities will create a taxable presence in a state. This assurance will
allow for managed growth without stifling competition or
discriminating against smaller taxpayers. The standard would also
provide the states with a bright-line test to determine taxability,
allowing for targeted auditing and enforcement activities and perhaps
leading to increased returns on audit costs. Cooperation among and
between the states and taxpayers will allow for the development of
universal and fair collection and compliance requirements, encourage
the development of a uniform tax base, and lead to increased tax
revenues due to increased compliance.
The ITFA provides the opportunity to present the physical
presence standard to Congress, and the need for a uniform, brightline standard that encourages economic growth via the Internet could
not be greater. Congress should take this opportunity to impose a
nationwide standard of physical presence in a state before taxation
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can occur. The Internet does not present an insurmountable obstacle
or one calling for drastic changes in the sales tax arena; rather, it is a
vehicle for creating ease and simplification in an area that is much in
need of a little of both.

